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 1  
Abstract 
 
Priority setting in health care under conventional rules of health economic evaluation is 
based upon the ethos of attempting to maximize post-treatment health gain given 
available health care resources. In his later years, Alan Williams advocated an alternative 
‘overarching’ decision rule that was informed by egalitarian principles, which is known 
as the ‘fair innings argument’. The fair innings approach balances differences in whole 
lifetime experiences of health (the egalitarian concern) with differences in post-treatment 
outcomes (the efficiency concern) when prioritizing people for health care. This article 
reports a study that presented respondents with a number of abstract health care decision 
contexts in an attempt to test, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the extent to which 
post-treatment health maximization, the fair innings argument, or, indeed other ‘decision 
rules’, are evident in the respondents’ answers. The results indicate that the most 
commonly observed decision rule differs substantially across health care contexts, 
possibly because underlying ‘values’ are context-dependent. Therefore, assuming that 
what individuals want has some relevance with respect to what policy-makers ought to do, 
the results of this study imply that rather than pursue an overarching decision rule, it may 
be more appropriate to vary the rule according to the particular health care decision 
context under consideration. 
 
Key words: Priority-setting; Fair innings; QALY-maximization; Empirical ethics; 
Qualitative analysis; Decision rules 
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1. Introduction 
 
Underlying the sub-discipline of health economics is the notion that available health care 
resources will always be insufficient to meet all health care demands. Choices have to be 
made; priority-setting, and even rationing, are inevitable. Health economists, and others, 
are therefore right to debate and analyze how society might ‘best’ use the resources 
available to this sector. 
 
So, how might society ‘best’ use the resources? The standard practice in the field of 
health economics is to assume that it is best to seek to maximize health gain inside the 
budget constraint, and many of those who work specifically in the area of health 
economic evaluation use quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as the measure of ‘health’. 
Some health economists have, however, questioned whether the sole adherence to this 
efficiency rule is appropriate when priority-setting health care interventions. Notable 
among these agent provocateurs was Alan Williams, who in his latter years wanted 
priorities to be informed by egalitarian principles. 
 
Williams’ thinking was influenced by the writings of John Harris, first in relation to 
Harris’ concern for the possibility of ‘double jeopardy’ (Harris, 1987), and second in his 
statement appertaining to a ‘fair innings’ (Harris, 1985). The double jeopardy argument is 
the concern that by applying the post-treatment QALY-maximization criteria, those who 
have experienced prior misfortune in their lives in terms of their health status (due to, for 
instance, a disability) have a greater chance of being placed as a lower priority when 
deciding who ought to receive treatment. For example, consider a blind man and a fully 
sighted man, both in need of a liver transplant operation but with there being only one 
available liver. The blind man has had the misfortune of being blind since birth, the first 
‘jeopardy’. Moreover, all other things equal, the blind man will have fewer post-
intervention expected QALYs than the fully-sighted man – the second ‘jeopardy – simply 
because the health state of ‘blind’ is likely to have a lower QALY value than that of 
‘fully sighted’. There is some limited empirical evidence that implies that most people 
would find QALY-maximization unfair in this context (Oliver, 2004). It was out of the 
concern for double jeopardy that Williams eventually developed his fair innings model, 
whereby it is argued that a social preference to compensate people for their health-related 
misfortunes in life may lead to them being prioritized even if treatment affords them 
relatively few QALYs. 
 
The essence of the basic ‘intergenerational’ fair innings argument outlined by Harris 
(1985) is that people who have achieved old age would not have their lives further 
prolonged if this was undertaken at the expense of those who had not yet realized their 
fair innings, presumably to give as many people as possible the opportunity to fulfil their 
ambitions and potential. Harris was concerned with a fair innings defined in terms of life-
expectancy, which, according to Williams (1997) is tied in with the view that people 
generally feel that everyone is entitled to a ‘normal’ span of life – e.g. the biblical three 
score years and ten. Williams (1997), however, was concerned with quality-adjusted life 
 4 
 
expectancy (QALE), 1  because he considered both the quality of a person’s health 
experiences and his/her length of life to be important considerations when assessing 
fairness in lifetime health. In short, although Williams still considered how much people 
could gain from treatment to be important, he also attached importance to how much they 
had so far had and could expect to have over the course of their whole life. Williams 
therefore believed that when prioritising people (or groups of people) for health care 
treatment, consideration of differences in post-treatment QALY gains (an efficiency 
argument) should be accompanied by consideration of differences in QALE (an equity 
argument). 
 
Williams explicitly focused on the issue of intergenerational equity in his 1997 article. 
However, it is quite clear, from this and other writings (Williams, 2001), that he was 
searching for an overarching ‘fair innings’ decision rule, and the QALE-related fair 
innings argument does indeed also have implications for priority-setting over people of 
the same generation with different prior and future health experiences and expectations. 
Nonetheless, the question remains open as to whether people would generally base their 
decisions on an overarching health care decision rule, or whether they would prefer the 
‘chosen’ rule, at the policy-making level, to be context-dependent. 
 
This article reports an explorative study where a number of abstract health care-related 
decision contexts were presented to respondents. The decision contexts included various 
intergenerational and intragenerational lifetime health profiles, and the objective of the 
study, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, was to test whether 
the respondents’ answers implied a tendency towards standard QALY-maximization, the 
QALE-related fair innings argument, or, indeed, some other decision rule irrespective of 
the context, or whether the predominant preferred decision rule across the sample of 
respondents varied according to the particular context under consideration. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Sample 
 
Fifty respondents participated in the study. Each respondent was paid £15 for attending 
one face-to-face interview, all of which were conducted by me. Forty respondents were 
postgraduate students, with the rest comprising of university staff (of whom 9 were 
educated to postgraduate level and 1 to undergraduate level). Twenty-eight respondents 
were female, 31 were aged 18-30 years (with 18 aged 31-45 years, and 1 aged >60 years), 
38 had a social science background (with 3 having a science background, 2 having a 
humanities background, 6 having an ‘other’ background and 1 unstated), and 39 stated 
that they were familiar with decision theory. The respondents were of 22 different 
nationalities. 
 
 
                                                 
1 QALE is simply the number of QALYs that a person (or, on average, a group of people) can expect to 
experience during his/her lifetime.  
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2.2. Questionnaire 
 
During the interview, the respondents were presented with three different types of 
questions: (1) questions intended to elicit health state values; (2) questions intended to 
identify the decision rules that the respondents use when prioritising patients for health 
care; (3) questions intended to test issues pertaining to sequencing effects in the valuation 
of health profiles. The order in which respondents were asked to answer the three types of 
question was randomized. The respondents had to complete one set of questions before 
moving onto the next, and once they had completed a particular set of questions, they 
could not revise their answers to those questions. The type (3) questions are not relevant 
to this paper and are reported elsewhere (in Oliver, 2008). 
 
2.2.1. Eliciting the health state values 
 
Five health states intermediate to ‘full health’ and ‘death’ were used in the study. 
Consistent with Williams’ fair innings article (Williams, 1997, p.122), the health states 
were described according to the Euroqol 5 dimension classification system (EQ-5D). The 
health states were labelled A to E, and were described in terms of a declining order of 
‘betterness’, such that A is unambiguously better than B, which is unambiguously better 
than C, etc. These health states, together with health state X used in the practice question, 
are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of the health states 
Health statei Mobility Self care  Usual  Pain/ Anxiety/  
   activitiesii discomfort depression 
X Some  Some Some Some Some 
 problems problems  problems 
A No No No None Some  
 problems problems problems 
B No No No Some Some  
 problems problems problems 
C Some No Some Some Some  
 problems problems problems 
D Some No Some Some Severe 
 problems problems problems 
E Some Some Severe Some Severe  
 problems problems problems 
Notes 
iThe respondents were told that full health would be a health state with no problems on any of the 
five dimensions.  
iiThe respondents were told that ‘usual activities’ relates to work, leisure, study etc.  
 
 
In eliciting the health state values, the respondents were therefore presented with a total 
of six questions, one of which was a practice question. They were required to answer the 
practice question before the five main questions to ensure that they understood the task, 
and were encouraged to ask questions during the practice session. All of the respondents 
appeared to understand the practice question, and explicitly stated that this was indeed the 
case. After completing the practice questions, they were required to answer the five main 
questions without asking any questions so as to reduce the possibility of interviewer bias, 
and they were allowed to return to previous questions in order to revise their answers if 
they so wished. The question used to elicit the respondents’ values for health state A is 
replicated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. A health state valuation question 
Consider the following two lifetime profiles.  
In profile S, you will live in health state A until age 50 years and then die.  
In profile T, you will live in full health for the whole of your life, but it is not known how 
long your life will be.  
 
 
How long would the length of life in profile T have to be in order for you to be 
indifferent between profile S and profile T? 
 
______years 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the health state values were elicited by means of the time trade-off 
(TTO) method. Williams (1997, p.125), in his calculations of expected lifetime QALYs, 
also relies on the TTO, and Williams’ calculations are used in the current study to 
calculate age weights (discussed later). Therefore, in order to maintain some consistency 
between the methods used to calculate the health state values and the age weights, the 
TTO was chosen as the method by which to elicit the health state values. 
 
Consider Figure 1, and denote the time in profile T that would render any particular 
respondent indifferent between profiles S and T as t. That respondent’s TTO value for 
health state A would thus be calculated from 50.v(A) = t.v(full health); therefore v(A) = 
t/50, where v(.) is the TTO value function and v(full health) = 1. It could of course be 
contended that there are problems with diagrammatically depicting the health states on 
the vertical axis as in Figure 1 because this representation may bias the values that the 
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respondents place on the health states. 2  This would be a reasonable and possibly 
legitimate criticism. Nonetheless, the view was taken that the diagrams would help the 
respondents to understand what was being asked of them, and thus the potential source of 
bias was traded off against possible improved understanding of the task at hand. 
 
2.2.2. Eliciting the decision rules 
 
In an attempt to elicit the respondents’ stated decision rules in circumstances where they 
were required to prioritize people for health care treatment, they were presented with a 
total of six questions, one of which was a practice question. The practice question is 
replicated in its entirety as Figure 2a, and the diagrammatic depictions contained within 
the five main priority-setting questions are presented as Figures 2b to 2f. 
 
The administration of the questions followed the same process as that for the health state 
value elicitation questions reported earlier. All of the respondents appeared to understand 
the practice question, and explicitly stated that this was the case. Although Figures 2b to 
2f are labelled ‘first main priority-setting question’, ‘second main priority-setting 
question’, etc, the order in which the questions were presented to the respondents was 
randomized. 
 
In each of the priority-setting questions, the respondents were presented with the lifetime 
health profiles of two patients, with these profiles first described in words and then 
depicted diagrammatically. As with the elicitation of the health state values, these 
diagrammatic depictions could be charged with introducing a biasing influence on the 
respondents’ answers, particularly with respect to the distances placed between the 
various health states. However, it would have been difficult for the respondents to grasp 
the health profiles without the diagrams, and so, again, the potential bias was traded off 
against a better understanding of the task. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In the TTO questions, the relative position of the different intermediate health states on the vertical axis of 
the diagram was altered across the questions to reflect the fact that health state A was unambiguously better 
than B, which was unambiguously better than C etc.  
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Figure 2a. The ‘practice’ priority-setting question 
Consider the following two patients. 
Patient P lives for 50 years in full health. At age 50 patient P suffers from an illness for which 
there is a health care treatment. Without treatment, patient P will die at age 50. With treatment, 
patient P will live for a further 20 years in health state C, and will then die. 
Patient Q lives for 60 years in health state C. At age 60 patient Q suffers from an illness for which 
there is a health care treatment. Without treatment, patient Q will die at age 60. With treatment, 
patient Q will live for a further 10 years in health state D, and will then die. 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
 
Assume that there are sufficient available health care resources to treat patient P or patient Q. 
Who would you prefer to treat? (please circle your answer) 
 
1. Patient P  2. Patient Q  3. Indifferent (i.e. choose randomly) 
 
Please explain the reason for your answer: 
 10 
 
Figure 2b. The first main priority-setting question 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
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Figure 2c. The second main priority-setting question 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
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Figure 2d. The third main priority-setting question 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
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Figure 2e. The fourth main priority-setting question 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
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Figure 2f. The fifth main priority-setting question 
Patient P 
 
Patient Q 
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The respondents were asked to assume that they are the health care decision-maker, and 
for each question, were informed that there are sufficient available health care resources 
to treat only one of the two patients. They were therefore asked which of the two patients 
they would prefer to treat. Three of the main questions (Figures 2b-2d) were 
intragenerational decision contexts and the remaining two (Figures 2e and 2f) were 
intergenerational decision contexts. After inputting their time trade-off values for the 
different health states (and, where relevant, age weighting these values – described in the 
next subsection), the intention was to observe whether the respondents’ answers to each 
question concurred with them maximizing post-treatment expected QALYs or 
minimizing the difference in total QALYs (which, it was thought, may be consistent with 
the fair innings argument). However, quantitative results are sufficient only for observing 
consistency with one or other of the decision rules. Some form of qualitative information 
is necessary to better understand the respondents’ underlying thought processes, and they 
were therefore asked to write down the reasons for their answers. 
 
2.2.3. Calculating the age weights 
 
For the quantitative tests of the fair innings argument, ‘raw’ QALY scores are not 
sufficient and were not therefore used. The fair innings argument assumes that more 
weight should be given to a QALY gained for the relatively young than the relatively old, 
because (all else equal) the relatively young have thus far accrued less of their fair 
innings. Using survey data derived from the EQ-5D classification system and the TTO 
elicitation method, Williams (1997, p.126) estimated a fair QALE for UK males of 61 
QALYs. He also provided expected lifetime QALY totals for social classes 1 and 2 
combined and for 4 and 5 combined for those at birth, and for those at age 20, 40, 60 and 
80 (Williams, 1997, p.125). In the absence of better available data, the age weights used 
in the current study were calculated from the data reported by Williams. 
 
Since most, perhaps all, of the respondents in the current study better associate 
themselves with social classes 1 and 2 (skilled professional) than 4 and 5 (unskilled 
manual), the expected QALY totals for the former subgroups were used, although for the 
purposes of this study it would not matter if the data for social classes 4 and 5 had been 
used instead. For those at age 0, 20, 40, 60 and 80, Williams gave figures of 65.8, 66.0, 
66.5, 67.6 and 73.9 expected lifetime QALYs, respectively. The age weights were 
derived by dividing the fair QALE by the actual QALE for each of these five ages.3 For 
example, the age weight at age 20 was set equal to 61/66 = 0.924. The age weights for all 
other ages between birth and 90 were estimated through simple extrapolation by me. The 
data and their extrapolation are of course open to question, but they do possess the 
essential feature of the fair innings argument in that the weights decrease with age, and 
decrease at an increasing rate in old age. 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, the weights should be calculated by (fair QALE/actual QALE)(1+r), where r is a measure 
of an individual’s (or group’s) aversion to inequality. However, due to the absence of a widely accepted 
inequality aversion parameter in the literature, (fair QALE/actual QALE) is used to approximate the 
weights. In any case, Mara Airoldi has run a sensitivity analysis on the inequality aversion parameter, and 
has found that the results of this study hold even for extreme variations in the parameter.   
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To test the fair innings argument, the lifetime QALY totals for each patient under the 
assumption of both treatment and no treatment in each of the five main priority-setting 
questions were therefore adjusted by the age weights. Standard post-treatment QALY-
maximization does not assume age weighting, but for all respondents and for all of the 
priority-setting questions, the application of the age weights did not in any case have any 
effect on which patient was estimated to have the highest number of post-treatment 
QALYs.4 
 
3. Results 
3.1. The health state values 
 
The sample statistics for the TTO values elicited for health states A to E are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
The health state valuesi 
  A B C D E  
Median 0.97  0.90 0.80 0.69 0.58 
Low 0.80 0.70 0.14 0.08 0.00 
High 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mean 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.64 0.54 
Standard dev. 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.23 
N 42 42 42 42 42 
Note 
iAll numbers in the table are given to two decimal places. 
 
 
Eight respondents demonstrated a strict violation of dominance in their TTO values, in 
that they valued an unambiguously inferior health state higher than an unambiguously 
superior health state. Only one of these appeared to do so due to a basic misunderstanding 
of the task presented to them in the main TTO questions, but the values elicited from 
these eight respondents are problematic and are not used in the calculation of the sample 
statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 It is also possible that the respondents would have discounted life years in the health profiles presented in 
the priority-setting questions, but it is not clear what the discount rate (if any) was for each respondent, or 
which age in these profiles the respondents would have taken as ‘year 1’ (e.g. at birth, or the age the 
respondent was then at?). In order to avoid additional complications, discount rates are not applied in this 
study. 
 17 
 
3.2. Quantitative results from the priority-setting questions 
 
As noted above, the quantitative tests in the priority-setting questions relied on the 
inputting of the respondents’ TTO values into the lifetime patient health profiles. Each 
priority-setting question was designed with the intention that choosing one of the patients 
would, for any particular respondent, be consistent with maximizing post-treatment 
QALYs while choosing the other patient would be consistent with minimizing the 
difference in lifetime QALYs across the two patients, with the latter being an indication 
of possible compliance with the fair innings argument. Table 3 provides a summary of 
whether the respondents tended ‘maximize’ or ‘minimize’ in the main priority-setting 
questions. 
 
Table 3 
The quantitative results of the priority-setting questions 
   Number of respondents ‘maximizing’ or ‘minimizing’ 
 Figure 2b Figure 2c  Figure 2d  Figure 2e  Figure 2f 
Maximizei 21 (42%)  3 ( 6%) 19 (38%) 15 (30%)  6 (12%) 
Minimizeii  7 (14%)  3 ( 6%) 18 (36%) 19 (38%) 26 (52%) 
Uncleariii 22 (44%) 44 (88%) 13 (26%) 16 (32%) 18 (36%) 
Notes 
i‘Maximize’ indicates that post-treatment QALYs are maximized. 
ii‘Minimize’ indicates that the difference in total age-weighted QALYs is minimized. 
iii‘Unclear’ indicates that it was not possible to tell whether post-treatment QALYs are maximized 
or the difference in total age-weighted QALYs is minimized. This was either because, for a 
particular question, a respondent’s TTO values meant that ‘maximizing’ and ‘minimizing’ 
required the prioritization of the same patient, or because a respondent’s TTO values strictly 
violated dominance and could not therefore be used.   
 
 
The reason why it is ‘unclear’ that a large number of the respondents either maximized 
post-treatment QALYs or minimized the difference in total age-weighted QALYs for the 
question replicated in Figure 2c is because most respondents, in selecting patient P in that 
question, both ‘maximized’ and ‘minimized’. When the question was designed it was 
thought that the six extra years in health state A offered to patient Q following treatment 
would be sufficient to outweigh the additional QALYs generated by moving from health 
states D/E to A for patient P compared to moving from health state C to A for patient Q. 
It was thus expected that choosing patient Q would generally serve to maximize post-
treatment QALYs. However, my expectations underestimated the difference in the TTO 
values given by the respondents for health states D and E compared to C. Consequently, 
for most respondents it is not even possible to guess at the preferred decision rule from 
the quantitative results for this particular question, although the qualitative explanations 
reported later will address this defect. 
  
At face value, the results presented in Table 3 do not offer much quantitative support for 
either QALY-maximization or the fair innings argument as an overarching decision rule. 
It appears that the preferred decision rule may well depend on the context presented; for 
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example, far more respondents ‘maximized’ than ‘minimized’ in the first question listed 
(an intragenerational context with marginal differences between the patients in both post-
treatment QALYs and pre-treatment health status), whilst the reverse was the case in the 
last question listed (a simple intergenerational question with no diminished health 
functioning for either patient). In the other questions, neither decision rule appeared to 
dominate. 
 
At this point the observant reader will say ‘wait a minute’: the fair innings argument 
involves consideration of a trade-off between the egalitarian concern of minimizing the 
difference in age-weighted QALE across the two patients and the efficiency concern of 
maximizing post-treatment QALYs. Therefore, although minimizing the difference in 
lifetime QALYs may offer an indication that the fair innings argument is at work, if the 
efficiency argument ‘dominates’ the egalitarian argument in the respondent’s ‘fair 
innings’ thought process, he may choose the patient that maximizes post-treatment 
QALYs. In short, some ‘apparent’ QALY maximizers may in fact have reached their 
decision through consideration of a fair innings.5 
 
Importantly, the extent of the trade-off differs across questions, which may result in a fair 
innings-complying respondent prioritizing the patient that maximizes post-treatment 
QALYs in one question, but choosing the patient that minimizes the difference in lifetime 
QALYs in another question. For example, consider a respondent who is just willing to 
accept a one QALY reduction in post-treatment QALY gain for a three QALY reduction 
in the difference in total QALYs between the two patients. If that respondent were asked 
to choose, say, patient P over patient Q knowing that to do so would narrow the 
difference in total QALYs by two for every post-treatment QALY he sacrificed, he would 
decline; if it narrowed the difference by four for every post-treatment QALY he 
sacrificed, he would accept. Thus, in some questions, this fair innings-minded respondent 
may still ‘maximize’, but in others he would ‘minimize’. 
 
For each priority-setting question used in this study, it is possible to calculate the 
maximum reduction in lifetime QALY inequality for each post-treatment QALY 
sacrificed for each respondent to still be allowed to ‘minimize’. To demonstrate how the 
‘maximum allowed trade-off’ is calculated, consider Figure 2b. Assume that a particular 
respondent values health states B, C and D at 0.8, 0.7 and 0.6, respectively. For 
simplicity, ignore age weighting in this illustrative example. For patient P, the total 
lifetime number of QALYs with treatment and without treatment is 32.5 and 17.5, 
respectively, and the post-treatment QALY gain is therefore 15. For patient Q, the 
comparable figures are respectively 36.2, 20 and 16.2. If P is chosen over Q, the 
difference in lifetime QALYs is 32.5 – 20 = 12.5. If Q is chosen over P, the difference in 
lifetime QALYs is 36.2 – 17.5 = 18.7. The ‘maximum allowed trade-off’ is calculated by 
dividing the difference between these two differences, by the number of post-treatment 
QALYs sacrificed by treating P rather than Q (i.e. 1.2). Therefore, the maximum allowed 
                                                 
5 An exception is the question replicated in Figure 4d. Here, the efficiency (or ‘maximize’) argument would 
require the respondent to express indifference, because the number of post-treatment QALYs is the same 
for the two patients. Therefore, any respondent who decided according to a fair innings would simply 
choose the patient that led to the smallest difference in lifetime QALYs. 
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trade-off is in this case (18.7-12.5)/1.2 = 5.17 QALYs. This would mean that if the 
respondent processes the question in accordance with the fair innings argument and is 
willing to trade-off each potential post-treatment QALY gained for a 5.17 reduction in 
the total lifetime QALY difference between the two patients, he will choose patient P. 
However, if he requires a greater reduction than 5.17 QALYs for each post-treatment 
QALY forgone, he will choose patient Q. 
 
I calculated the maximum allowed trade-off for each respondent in each question on the 
basis of their TTO values, and found that it does indeed differ across questions (and 
across respondents), which indicates that more respondents may have been consistently 
using the fair innings argument than intimated earlier in the ‘at face value’ conclusions 
derived from Table 3. Table 4 presents the maximum allowed trade-off sample statistics 
for each of the questions and shows that the median allowed trade-off value is much 
lower for the question replicated in Figure 2b than that in Figure 2f, which is consistent 
with the results presented in Table 3 that show that more respondents chose to 
‘maximize’ than ‘minimize’ in the former question, while more chose to ‘minimize’ than 
‘maximize’ in the latter question. 
 
Table 4 
The maximum allowed trade-off in the priority-setting questionsi 
 Figure 2b  Figure 2c  Figure 2d  Figure 2e  Figure 2f 
Median  5.07    3.55    -   5.02  11.70 
Low   1.00    1.00    -   1.21  11.70 
High  27.25  511.07    -  14.58  11.70 
Mean   6.77  101.94     -   5.67  11.70 
Standard dev.  6.35   204.00    -   2.74   0.00 
N    42      6    -    42    42 
Note 
iIn many instances, it was not possible to calculate a respondent’s maximum allowed trade-off. 
This was: (i) because the respondent’s TTO values meant that maximizing and minimizing 
required the prioritization of the same patient and thus there was not a trade-off to be made (as 
was often the case for the question replicated in Figure 2c); (ii) because the respondent’s TTO 
values strictly violated dominance and could not be used; or (iii) because, in the case of the 
question replicated in Figure 2d, the patients had the same post-treatment QALY gain, and thus 
compliance with the fair innings argument would mean that the respondents would always choose 
to minimize the difference in total age-weighted QALYs irrespective of the size of the reduction 
on offer. 
 
 
For the question replicated in Figure 2c, maximum allowed trade-off values could be 
elicited from only 6 respondents, a number too small to form any meaningful hypotheses. 
As noted in Table 4, there are no maximum allowed trade-off values for the question 
replicated in Figure 2d, because here the patients have the same post-treatment QALY 
gain, and thus a consideration of the fair innings argument would mean that the 
respondents would always choose to ‘minimize’. That the respondents appeared to be 
divided approximately equally between ‘maximizing’ and ‘minimizing’ in this question 
(see Table 3) somewhat undermines both post-treatment QALY-maximization and the 
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fair innings argument as overarching decision rules. The results in Table 4 for the 
question replicated in Figure 2e are also somewhat worrying for supporters of the fair 
innings argument; given that more respondents ‘minimized’ in this question than that in 
Figure 2b, one would have expected the median allowed trade-off to be greater than that 
for Figure 2b. 
 
It is possible to speculate indefinitely on the basis of these quantitative results. However, 
for a richer understanding of the decision rules employed by the respondents when 
choosing between the patients, it might prove fruitful to turn to their qualitative 
explanations. 
 
 
3.3. Qualitative results from the priority-setting questions 
 
I summarized the written explanations that each respondent gave for their answers into a 
number of short decision rules.6 The rules that the respondents used, together with the 
number of respondents who answered according to each rule, are presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 
The decision rules used in the priority-setting questions 
  Number of respondents complying with the decision rule  
  Figure 2b  Figure 2c  Figure 2d  Figure 2e  Figure 2f 
QALY maxi    6    11    19    14     3 
Life yr maxii   11     6     0     0     4 
Rel QALYiii    8     0     4     0     0 
Fair inningsiv    8    18    19    14     9 
Life yr equalv    0     1     0    11    16 
QALY equalvi    1     0     0     0     0 
Equal accessvii    9     2     2     3     7 
Productivityviii    1     1     0     3     9 
Suffer minix    0     8     0     1     0 
Cost minx    0     1     0     1     0 
Fair resourcesxi   1     0     1     0     0 
Unclearxii      5     2     5     3     2 
 
Summary 
  
Post-treatment   25 (50%)  17 (34%)  23 (46%)  14 (28%)   7 (14%) 
                                                 
6 Summarizing the respondents’ explanations into short decision rules is not, in every case, an easy task 
because some explanations are open to interpretation. Therefore, to allow interested readers to reach their 
own conclusions, and even perhaps test their own hypotheses, the complete set of qualitative explanations 
as reported by the respondents is available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSEHealthAndSocialCare/LSEHealth/ 
documents/ADAMOLIVER/Afairtestofthefairinningsrespondentsexplanations.xls. A few of the 
respondents offered more than one explanation for their answer to a particular question; in these cases, I 
categorized according to what appeared to be the principal explanation.   
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health outcomes  
maximizationxiii 
 
Concern with   9 (18%)  19 (38%)  19 (38%)  25 (50%)  25 (50%) 
distribution 
of outcomesxiv 
  
Others     16 (32%)  14 (28%)   8 (16%)  11 (22%)  18 (36%) 
(including 
‘unclear’) 
Notes 
iQALY max (QALY-maximization): The respondent indicated that post-treatment health states 
and lengths of life drove their decision. 
iiLife yr max (Life-year maximization): The respondent indicated that only post-treatment length 
of life drove their decision. 
iiiRel QALY (Relative QALY-maximization): The respondent indicated that compared to a 
patient who has a relatively poor pre-treatment health status, a patient who has a better pre-
treatment health status will experience lower utility from a specified lower post-treatment health 
state. This decision rule may be linked to notions of adaptation, in that a person who has had a 
worse pre-treatment experience may adapt better to the post-treatment experience. Relative 
QALY-maximization was outlined formally as a possible health care decision rule by 
Johannesson (2001).  
ivFair innings: The respondent indicated that they traded-off the differences between the pre-
treatment health experiences and the post-treatment outcomes in those cases where both pre-
treatment health and post-treatment outcomes differ across the two patients. Where pre-treatment 
health states are not different (as in Figure 2c) or post-treatment outcomes are not different (as in 
Figure 2d), the fair innings argument only requires an explicit judgment on the basis of post-
treatment outcomes in the former case or pre-treatment health status in the latter case. Sometimes 
respondents specifically stated ‘fair innings’ as their answer, and in these cases the admittedly 
strong assumption is made that the decisions of these respondents concurred with the technical 
meaning of a fair innings. 
vLife yr equal (Life-year equalization): The respondent indicated that they attempted to make the 
life expectancies of the patients as equal as possible, but did not mention the differences in post-
treatment outcomes. This differs from Harris’ original fair innings argument in that according to 
Harris, to prioritize the younger person, the older person would have had to have reached an age 
that at least meets some pre-defined ‘fair innings’ threshold. If the respondents felt that patient Q 
in Figures 2e and 2f had met the fair innings threshold, then a decision consistent with life-year 
equalization would comply with Harris’ original fair innings argument. 
viQALY equal (QALY-equalization): The respondent indicated that they attempted to make the 
total QALYs of the patients as equal as possible, but did not mention the differences in post-
treatment outcomes. 
viiEqual access: The respondent would not discriminate between the two patients.  
viiiProductivity: The respondent indicated that they believe that the patient who they think will be 
more productive for society/family ought to be prioritized.  
ixSuffer min (Suffering-minimization): The explanations given for the question in Figure 2c were, 
on the whole, the most difficult to categorize. Some explanations seemed to suggest that in the 
absence of treatment one of the patients would suffer and the other would not and thus the 
suffering patient was chosen for that reason. These explanations have been categorized as being 
motivated by ‘suffering-minimization’. Other explanations appeared to suggest that both patients 
would suffer in the absence of treatment, but that it would be better to treat the patient that has the 
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worst health without treatment. These explanations have been categorized as being consistent 
with the fair innings argument. This categorization is not important for the overall conclusions of 
this particular article.   
xCost min (Cost-minimization): The respondent indicated that they would treat the patient whose 
treatment they believe will be the least expensive. 
xiFair resour (Fair resources): The respondent indicated that they would treat the patient that 
would result in what they believed would be the most equal final distribution of health care 
resources. 
xiiUnclear: The reasoning process that the respondent used is not understandable.  
xiiiIncludes QALY-maximization, life-year maximization and relative QALY-maximization.  
xivIncludes fair innings, life-year equalization and QALY-equalization. 
 
Table 5 shows that the respondents used a host of decision rules, the prevalence of which 
varied substantially across the questions. Detailed explanations of each of the decision 
rules are given in the notes to the table, but, briefly, in addition to QALY-maximization 
and the Williams fair innings argument, they included concerns for maximizing life-
years, maximizing health after adjudicating for the possibility that different respondents 
may differentially ‘appreciate’ a particular health state depending on the health state to 
which they are accustomed, securing equal access to health care, minimizing the 
differences in life-years or QALYs across patients, maximizing productivity, minimizing 
suffering, minimizing health care costs, and distributing health care resources equitably. 
It is therefore clear that the rules were not confined exclusively to concerns about pre- 
and post-treatment health states. 
 
In the bottom half of Table 5, the various decision rules are summarized into those that 
are formed by post-treatment health outcomes maximization of one form or another (the 
efficiency argument), those formed by egalitarian considerations (which includes the fair 
innings argument and its close relation, ‘life-year equalization’7), and those formed by 
‘other’ concerns. The general trend in the decision rules employed by the respondents 
across the questions correspond quite closely with the quantitative results reported in 
Table 3, and thus serve to underline the question mark against whether the application of 
any single overarching decision rule across all health care prioritization contexts is an 
appropriate strategy to pursue.8 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Underlying value systems may influence people’s preferred decision rules for allocating 
health care resources. The results of the study reported in this article suggest that for 
many people, values may well change with the decision context. Consequently, the 
                                                 
7 Categorized under ‘life-year equalization’ are explanations that focus upon narrowing the distribution of 
time alive. Strictly speaking, this does not concord with Williams’ fair innings argument, as no explicit 
mention is made of the difference in post-treatment outcomes. However, in some cases respondents may 
have considered the differences in both total life years and post-treatment outcomes, but might have just 
alluded to the difference in total life years for reasons of brevity.  
8 In a respondent-by-respondent breakdown of results, it is perhaps also worth noting that their qualitative 
explanations, almost without exception, do not conflict with their quantitative answers.  
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‘predominant’ decision rule can vary by context. Evidence-based medicine has generally 
assumed that post-treatment maximization is the appropriate overarching decision rule, 
and recommendations for ‘best practice’, both with respect to clinical and economic 
evaluation, have followed accordingly. Williams (1997) advocated the fair innings 
argument as an alternative rule, but the results of this study suggest that the search for 
(and application of) an overarching decision rule is misguided. 
 
How might the context-dependent nature of preferred decision rules be incorporated into 
the policy-making process? Specific, quantitative calculations may be too ‘rigid’ to 
capture the complex pattern of decision rules used across contexts, and therefore 
deliberative judgements might be better employed to guide health care decision making. 
For instance, in the liver transplant example given in the Introduction, the policy maker 
may find that striving to offer equal access best aligns with ‘population’ values, whilst 
preferences over the type of intergenerational context presented in Figure 2f might 
suggest that the relatively young ought to sometimes take particularly high priority. To 
account for ‘context’, the priority-setting approach therefore perhaps ought to be 
undertaken on a deliberative health care ‘intervention-by-intervention’ basis, rather than 
always assuming that one rule (e.g. maximising post-treatment QALYs, or striving to 
produce a population-wide fair innings) should predominate. 
 
It is of course recognized that the study reported in this article has caveats – the article is 
littered with acknowledgments of them. For example, the methodological limitations of 
the time trade-off technique 9 , the use of anxiety/depression as the deteriorating 
dimension in the health states10, the potentially biasing influence of the diagrammatic 
depictions in the questions, the approximations and secondary data used in the calculation 
of the age weights, and the difficulties of interpreting the respondents’ qualitative 
explanations to align with the specified decision rules, are all open to debate. Moreover, 
the design of the priority-setting questions may have caused some respondents to answer 
the questions in ways that were not intended. Some respondents incorporated information 
that they may have felt was important but that was not actually in the questions, for 
instance in forming their decisions on the basis of cost-minimization or a fair distribution 
of lifetime health care resources even though no information on the costs of care (other 
than that treatment for only one of the two patients could be afforded) was given. Also, 
some respondents probably used simple heuristics to reach their decisions by focusing on 
one particular aspect of the contexts before them rather than reaching fully ‘reasoned’ 
answers, although 46 of the 50 respondents varied their decision rules across the 
questions, which somewhat mitigates the concern that the respondents were rigid in their 
thinking. There are also other caveats. For example, is it appropriate (as is also common 
                                                 
9 The TTO relies on the heroic assumption that respondents have a zero rate of time preference. See: 
Johannesson et al. (1994).  
10 Due to the possibility that some of the respondents may have felt that severe anxiety/depression would be 
difficult to bear for protracted periods, some may contend that lives that involve long periods of health 
states D and/or E are not worth living. This concern was not, however, represented in the TTO values (an 
evaluation technique that relies on the consideration of long periods of the health states in question), where 
0 and 2 of the 50 respondents respectively valued health states D and E as low as death. Moreover, in the 
priority-setting questions, only one respondent explicitly stated that a life involving these health states (for 
the question in Figure 2e) was worse than death.  
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e 
erely assume. 
 
practice in the health economics literature) to elicit health state values in questions that 
focus on preferences for one’s own health, and then apply these values to inform choices 
across others? In sum, this study is not an ‘end’, and other than showing a clear tendency 
for decision rules to vary across decision contexts, provides no specific, concrete 
conclusions. But the study is an exploratory first step, and it does, it is hoped, raise a 
number of hypotheses that will encourage others to take up the mantel of testing, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, the ethical principles that some would prefer that w
m
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